Abstract

The dissertation is based upon two discoveries: first, that Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. put forth a comprehensive theory of law, and not simply a series of reflective observations upon various jurisprudential topics, and second, that no single full-length analytical treatment of Holmes' legal thought existed in the literature. In light of these facts, I attempt to formulate and to evaluate Holmes' overall legal theory. By means of a comparative analysis, contrasting the legal thought of Holmes with the philosophical positions of several American pragmatist philosophers, I demonstrate that the three most fundamental branches of Holmes' legal thought can be cohesively integrated in a recognition of their underlying pragmatic orientation. The result of this analysis is my substantive reconstruction of Holmes' Theory of Law, which is subdivided into a theory of the meaning of legal concepts, a theory of the external standards of legal justification, and a theory of experimentalist judicial and legislative reasoning. I also show that, when viewed in such a comprehensive light, "Holmes' Theory" is a significantly more formidable theoretical approach than has been previously thought--many of the "classic" objections to Holmes' legal thought are shown to be either misguided, overly simplistic, or the result of a fundamental meta-theoretical incommensurability