Abstract

Every moral tradition and every moral theory necessarily presupposes some specific view of how the mind works and of what a person is. The cognitive sciences constitute our principal source of knowledge about human cognition and psychology. Consequently, the cognitive sciences are absolutely crucial to moral philosophy. They are crucial in two basic ways. First, any plausible moral system must be based on reasonable assumptions about the nature of concepts, reasoning, and moral psychology. Second, the more we know about such important issues as the role of emotion in moral deliberation, the nature of moral development, and the most realistic conceptions of human well‐being, the more informed we will be in our moral thinking. Empirical investigations into mind thus provide a way of examining the presuppositional link between the is of mental functioning (e.g., how concepts are structured, the nature of rational inference, the role of emotion in reasoning) and the ought of moralitys – that is, the normative claims of our ethical system.