Conceptual metaphor and embodied structures of meaning: A reply to Kennedy and Vervaeke

Philosophical Psychology 6 (4):413 – 422 (1993)
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Abstract

J. M. Kennedy and J. Vervaeke argue that my view of the bodily and imaginative basis of meaning commits me to a mistaken reductionism and to the erroneous view that metaphors actually impose structure on the target domain. I explain the sense in which image schemas are central to the bodily grounding of meaning, although in a way that is not reductionistic. I then show how conceptual metaphors can involve pre-existing image-schematic structure and yet can also be partially constitutive of the conceptual structure of the target domain. In this way human conceptual systems can be both rooted in patterns of our bodily interactions and at the same time can be subject to various kinds of imaginative development and extension.

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