Measuring the size of a benefit and its moral weight On the significance of John Broome's: “Interpersonal Addition Theorem”

Theoria 61 (1):25-60 (1995)
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Citations of this work

The priority view.David McCarthy - 2017 - Economics and Philosophy 33 (2):215–57.
Utilitarianism and prioritarianism II.David McCarthy - 2008 - Economics and Philosophy 24 (1):1-33.
Utilitarianism and prioritarianism I.David Mccarthy - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):335-363.
Reconsidering the value of equality.Iwao Hirose - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):301-312.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
The Foundations of Statistics.Leonard Savage - 1954 - Wiley Publications in Statistics.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1984 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance.James Griffin - 1986 - Oxford [Oxfordshire]: Clarendon Press.

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