Abstract

Jerome Gellman argues in Experience of God that there is “some” reasonable application of the canons of rationality to the facts concerning apparent experiences of God “on which it is reasonable to believe that God exists and not reasonable to believe that God does not exist”. The book is divided into seven chapters. The first chapter sets the conceptual groundwork, discussing the meaning and reference of “God,” what is meant by “experience of God,” and the like. Gellman’s treatment of “God” as a proper name in terms of reference is especially interesting, and resurfaces at crucial turns later in the book. The main argument, appealing to a modified and extended version of Richard Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity, is given in the second chapter. The remaining chapters attempt, with varying success, to answer the major objections facing this sort of argument from religious experience, including the claim that the experiential evidence for theism is outweighed or vitiated by others’ failures to experience God; the problems posed by the diversity of religious experience in different religions; the claim that the best explanations of religious experience are nonreligious; the claim that the alleged object of theistic experience is conceptually incoherent; and the relevance of the problem of evil.