Abstract

The starting point of the investigations undertaken in the article is the thesis of empirical indeterminacy of scientific theories. According to this thesis the same set of empirical data can be differently explained by different theories, none of which will be found compelling. The reason for that is that no specific theory is a logical consequence of observational statements. This thesis can be so generalized as to include systems of value as well. Theoretical statements serve as justification of observational statements, although the former are not entailed by the latter. Similarly with judgements of value: they justify moral norms but are not entailed by them. Consequently the same obligations can be justified on the grounds of different systems of value. Systems of value are not therefore determined by moral obligations and have the same function in ethics as theory does in science. Systems of value remain, however, radically different from scientific theories because the relations that bind observational statements with scientific observations are quite different from those that bind moral norms with human behaviour in ethics.