Abstract
Schopenhauer defends the view that emotions impair cognition, while Nietzsche apparently replies that they are ineliminable from cognition, and that they enhance it. Schopenhauer argues that human individuals are naturally disposed to comprehend their environment in affective terms. At the same time, his evaluative position concerning this relation is negative: cognition is spoiled, warped, or tainted by its inability to shake off the emotions, desires, or drives that belong to human nature. Human individuals are not cut out for cognition proper, unless they become ‘pure subject of cognition’ in aesthetic experience, or in total self-negation of the will. Nietzsche accepts something analogous to Schopenhauer’s descriptive position: the self is a complex of drives and it is primarily these drives and their associated affects that interpret the world. But he firmly rejects Schopenhauer’s evaluative stance. He denies the possibility of a pure, objective, affect-free cognition. Nietzsche argues for a reversal of Schopenhauer’s evaluative stance: cognition is improved by affect, and by multiplying affects. This is a key point in Nietzsche’s so-called perspectivism im Genealogy III, 12. The view that Nietzsche regards affects as necessary for cognition has been challenged as either trivial or implausible by recent commentators. The essay addresses these challenges, arguing that it is quite plausible for Nietzsche to be holding such a view, and that it can be construed in ways that make it a more attractive view in itself.