XII-Leibniz's Law and the Philosophy of Mind

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (3):269-283 (2012)
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Abstract

We draw some metaphysical conclusions about colour and belief from some epistemological commonplaces. It turns out that this requires us to challenge orthodoxy on the causal efficacy of mental properties and to rewrite the standard argument against dualism, but in a way which is good news for functionalists about the mind.

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Citations of this work

Folk Core Beliefs about Color.Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Ann Schmidtke - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):849-869.

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References found in this work

Quantifiers and propositional attitudes.Willard van Orman Quine - 1955 - Journal of Philosophy 53 (5):177-187.
Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
The refutation of idealism.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Mind 12 (48):433-453.

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