Don't Forget About the Correspondence Theory of Truth

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):42-47 (2004)
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Abstract

Contra Lewis, it is argued that the correspondence theory is a genuine rival theory of truth: it goes beyond the redundancy theory; it competes with other theories of truth; it is aptly summarized by the slogan 'truth is correspondence to fact'; and it really is a theory of truth.

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Graham Priest
CUNY Graduate Center

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