The Virtues of Rational Agents

In Aristotle's first principles. New York: Oxford University Press (1988)
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Abstract

Aristotle’s account of virtues follows the same line of argument found in his account of the good. He relies on his metaphysical theory of essence as form and function, and on his psychological theory of human function as rational agency. He uses these theories to organise, explain, defend, and modify common beliefs. In doing so, he shows that his ethical theory is not purely dialectical, but also strong dialectic.

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