Abstract

One of the most important features of natural language is that it enables its users to talk about an object before having experienced the object, or talk about an object without knowing which object it is. We can talk about the smallest island on earth before experiencing it, or we can talk about the smallest perfect number without knowing which number it is. I call terms that are used to make this kind of reference "inostensible." In this essay I discuss three popular distinctions in analytic philosophy in relation to the use of inostensible terms: knowledge by acquaintance/knowledge by description, de re/dicto, and the referential/attributive uses of terms. I try to explore how such reference is possible, what types of terms in a language can be used inostensibly, what types of propositions and knowledge can be expressed by the use of inostensible terms, and other important semantic and epistemological issues related to inostensible reference