The Development of Reid’s Realism

The Monist 61 (2):245-256 (1978)
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Abstract

Thomas Reid’s theory of perception is presented in two separate works published more than twenty years apart. For the most part scholars have agreed with D.D. Todd’s view that “there is very little that in any rich sense can be called development in Reid’s philosophy.” The general view seems to be that the two works differ in emphasis and presentation rather than in philosophical position. Reid himself lends support to this interpretation by remarking to former students that in the Intellectual Powers they will “recognise the doctrine which they heard, some of them thirty years ago”.

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Citations of this work

The problem with Reid's direct realism.Todd Buras - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (209):457-477.
Reid on the priority of natural language.John Turri - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):214-223.
Perception as a Multi-Stage Process: A Reidian Account.Marina Folescu - 2021 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 19 (1):57-74.
Is Thomas Reid a Direct Realist about Perception?Hagit Benbaji - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):1-29.

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