Priority of duties, substantive human rights, and African communalism

South African Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):421-435 (2021)
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Abstract

I argue for a plausible view of the African idea and practice of substantive individual rights. This view indicates that rights are a means of enhancing individual dignity in the context of a communal system of correlativity of duties and rights. This view is exemplified in Menkiti’s idea of the priority of duties. I explicate this idea and indicate how it highlights the inherent social-communal nature of humans that is implicated in African normative conception of “personhood”.

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Polycarp A. Ikuenobe
Kent State University

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References found in this work

Ubuntu as a Moral Theory and Human Rights in South Africa.Thaddeus Metz - 2011 - African Human Rights Law Journal 11 (2):532-559.
On the Normative Conception of a Person.Ifeanyi A. Menkiti - 2004 - In Kwasi Wiredu (ed.), A Companion to African Philosophy. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 324–331.
In Defence of an Autocentric Account of Ubuntu.Jason van Niekerk - 2007 - South African Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):364-368.

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