Composing Our "Selves": Aristotelian and Fictional Personhood

(1994)
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Abstract

The postmodern 'dismantling' of the self is often regarded, in sensationalist terms, as threatening to undermine most if not all of our familiar ideas concerning philosophy and morality. This is so because in challenging our 'commonplace' concept of what it is to be a person - a concept with a heavy Cartesian legacy - it also challenges the standard visions of how we stand, or fail to stand, as knowers in relation to reality and causes upset to the grounds for many of our ethico-political practices

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Daniel D. Hutto
University of Wollongong

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