Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism

In Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford Studies in Metaethics: Volume 1. Clarendon Press. pp. 265-94 (2006)
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Abstract

Contemporary Kantianism is often regarded as both a position within normative ethics and as an alternative to metaethical moral realism. We argue that it is not clear how contemporary Kantianism can distinguish itself from moral realism. There are many Kantian positions. For reasons of space we focus on the position of one of the most prominent, contemporary Kantians, Christine Korsgaard. Our claim is that she fails to show either that Kantianism is different or that it is better than realism. Our strategy is to argue that what are supposed to be claims that conflict with realism in fact do not.

Other Versions

original Hussain, Nadeem; Shah, Nishi (2006) "Misunderstanding metaethics: Korsgaard's rejection of realism". Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1():265-294

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Citations of this work

What is constructivism in ethics and metaethics?Sharon Street - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (5):363-384.
Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.
Constitutivism about Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - 2018 - In Daniel Star, The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 367-394.
Constructivism in metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Constructivism in metaethics.Carla Bagnoli - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Valuing and the Will.Michael E. Bratman - 2000 - Noûs 34 (s14):249 - 265.
Agency and causal explanation.Jennifer Hornsby - 1997 - In Alfred R. Mele, The philosophy of action. New York: Oxford University Press.

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