Functional dependencies, supervenience, and consequence relations

Journal of Logic, Language and Information 2 (4):309-336 (1993)
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Abstract

An analogy between functional dependencies and implicational formulas of sentential logic has been discussed in the literature. We feel that a somewhat different connexion between dependency theory and sentential logic is suggested by the similarity between Armstrong's axioms for functional dependencies and Tarski's defining conditions for consequence relations, and we pursue aspects of this other analogy here for their theoretical interest. The analogy suggests, for example, a different semantic interpretation of consequence relations: instead of thinking ofB as a consequence of a set of formulas {A1,...,A n} whenB is true on every assignment of truth-values on which eachA i is true, we can think of this relation as obtaining when every pair of truth-value assignments which give the same truth-values toA 1, the same truth-values toA 2,..., and the same truth-values toA n, also make the same assignment in respect ofB. We describe the former as the consequence relation inference-determined by the class of truth-value assignments (valuations) under consideration, and the latter as the consequence relation supervenience-determined by that class of assignments. Some comparisons will be made between these two notions.

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Citations of this work

Supervenience, Dependence, Disjunction.Lloyd Humberstone - 2019 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 28 (1):3-135.
The Modal Logic of Agreement and Noncontingency.Lloyd Humberstone - 2002 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 43 (2):95-127.
A Modal Logic of Supervenience.Jie Fan - 2019 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 60 (2):283-309.

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Statements partly about observation.David Lewis - 1988 - Philosophical Papers 17 (1):1-31.

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