Abstract

Agar is inadvertently pointing to two more subtle problems with transhumanist ethics however, ones with which many of us are grappling. The first is the problem of balancing beneficent solidarism with strict non-interventionist liberalism. When, for instance, is someone's choice to modify their brain equivalent to selling themselves into slavery? Transhumanists need to articulate "the good life," inevitably shaped by local values, to ensure that we are in fact enhancing and not simply changing. Second and related, transhumanists need to be clear about the cognitive capacities that we consider important for the posthuman polity. Would it be acceptable for some posthumans to expunge all fellow-feeling for mere humans, or for any other persons? Whether local or universal values, ensuring that our descendents retain capacities for solidarity and egalitarianism will limit transhumanist liberalism and the space of posthuman possibilities.