What’s Special about Humeanism

Noûs 33 (1):30-45 (1999)
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Abstract

One of the attractions of the Humean instrumentalist theory of practical rationality is that it appears to offer a special connection between an agent's reasons and her motivation. The assumption that Humeanism is able to assert a strong connection between reason and motivation has been challenged, most notably by Christine Korsgaard. She argues that Humeanism is not special in the connection it allows to motivation. On the contrary, Humean theories of practical rationality do connect reasons and motivation in a unique and attractive way, though the nature of this connection has sometimes been misunderstood by both defenders and detractors of the theory.

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Donald Hubin
Ohio State University

Citations of this work

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References found in this work

Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
Was Hume a Humean?Elijah Millgram - 1995 - Hume Studies 21 (1):75-94.
Prudential Reasons.D. Clayton Hubin - 1980 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):63 - 81.
Teleology, consequentialism, and the past.Peter Vallentyne - 1988 - Journal of Value Inquiry 22 (2):89-101.

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