Abstract

Philosophical psychology is an area where both philosophers and scientists investigate shared problems. This study examines a number of conceptual and empirical issues raised in perceptual theory, where such collaboration has been fruitful. The first part of this work is critical of traditional philosophical solutions to these perceptual issues, claiming that a rational reconstruction of core perceptual skills is required. The next section supports views arising from a mixture of psychology and philosophy in a search for the underlying competence of perceptual performance. ;The two best examples of perceptual collaboration between psychology and philosophy, resulting in the right sort of theory, are direct realism and constructivism. I set out and examine in detail, versions of these materially equivalent theories, compare and contrast them, and use deficit analysis, among other ways, as a means of testing them. This 'impurist' approach to the problems of perception is defended throughout. Within this framework, I conclude that direct realism is correct in claiming a vast array of information is available to the perceiver, while constructivism is correct in claiming that the many skills of perception are cognitive, and are tied to mental processes or principles.