Abstract

What is Mill's conception of liberty? What are his rational defense of liberty and the theoretical nature of his defense? How should Mill's merits and limitations be assessed? This dissertation attempts to rethink these questions that are central to the study of Mill's liberalism. To attain a new understanding of Mill's liberalism, this dissertation intends to challenge the ahistorical methodology often used in the current study of Mill's liberal theory; and to suggest a substitute for it in a new historical methodology with the characteristics of a triadic frame for liberty, discriminative categorization, contextual analysis and historical evaluation. This dissertation reaches a preliminary conclusion: Mill's liberalism provides a threefold conception of liberty as freedom from social tyranny, freedom to full and mature development of individuality, and freedom of the minority as deserving to be protected and represented even though the majority rules. Underlying Mill's defense of liberty is a kind of teleology without consequentialism and essentialism. Thus, Mill's liberalism significantly differs from, and fruitfully develops, the earlier British liberalism. Mill's teleological liberalism is a creative articulation of his own personal experience within the cultural context of his time