The Russellian monist’s problems with mental causation

Philosophical Quarterly 65 (258):22-39 (2015)
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10.1093/pq/pqu058

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Robert Howell
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Citations of this work

Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Marcelino Botin - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):1829-1848.
The Phenomenal Powers View and the Meta-Problem of Consciousness.Hedda Hassel Mørch - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):131-142.
Did the universe design itself?Philip Goff - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (1):99-122.

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References found in this work

From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Mental causation.Stephen Yablo - 1992 - Philosophical Review 101 (2):245-280.
Panpsychism and Panprotopsychism.David Chalmers - 2013 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy 8.
Physicalism, or Something near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (223):306-310.
Making sense of emergence.Jaegwon Kim - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (1-2):3-36.

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