Regulative Assumptions, Hinge Propositions and the Peircean Conception of Truth

Erkenntnis 78 (2):451-468 (2013)
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Abstract

This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are popularly called ‘hinge propositions’

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Andrew Howat
California State University, Fullerton

Citations of this work

Charles Peirce's Limit Concept of Truth.Catherine Legg - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (3):204-213.
Pragmatism and Correspondence.Andrew Howat - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):685-704.
Prospects for Peircean Truth.Andrew Howat - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (3-4):365-387.
A Pragmatic-Semiotic Defence of Bivalence.Marc Champagne - 2021 - History and Philosophy of Logic 43 (2):143-157.

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References found in this work

Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Kellogg Lewis - 1969 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Wiley-Blackwell.
Truth and objectivity.Crispin Wright - 1992 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
On Certainty (ed. Anscombe and von Wright).Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - San Francisco: Harper Torchbooks. Edited by G. E. M. Anscombe, G. H. von Wright & Mel Bochner.
Convention: A Philosophical Study.David Lewis - 1969 - Synthese 26 (1):153-157.

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