Abstract

We sometimes perform actions intentionally and freely, while knowing, or judging, that another possible action would have been overall a better one. This familiar phenomenon is commonly known as weakness of will. However, the explanation of weakness of will seems to incur many difficulties, and, as a result, many philosophers, both ancient and contemporary, seriously doubt that weakness of will is possible. In this dissertation, I argue that weakness of will is possible, and that there are acceptable explanations for it. To do this, I propose the Motivational Strength Approach, according to which weakness of will is best characterized as resulting from a split between one's evaluation and motivation. ;The Motivational Strength Approach is not completely novel. Indeed, some main theses of this approach are assumed, at least implicitly, by many philosophers who discuss weakness of will. But the approach as a whole has never been clearly established. Furthermore, there are some widely held criticisms to this kind of approach. The purpose of this dissertation is to present the Motivational Strength Approach in detail and to show that this approach provides an adequate explanation for weakness of will