Consciousness in act and action

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper develops an account of consciousness in action. Both consciousness and action are related to knowledge. A voluntary action is defined as a volition, or something intentionally effected by means of such volitions. Volitions are conscious mental acts whose proper function is to make their content true. A mental act is the exercise of a power of mind and a conscious mental act is identical with knowledge of its own phenomenal character. This set of definitions elucidates the relations between consciousness, action and knowledge

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,830

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Mental Action and the Conscious Mind.Michael Brent & Lisa Miracchi (eds.) - 2023 - New York, NY: Routledge.
Reclaiming volition: An alternative interpretation of Libet's experiment.Jing Zhu - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (11):61-77.
Why volition is a foundation issue for psychology.Bernard J. Baars - 1993 - Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):281-309.
Volition and the readiness potential.Gilberto Gomes - 1999 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 6 (8-9):59-76.
The stream of thoughts versus mental acts.Richard W. Taylor - 1963 - Philosophical Quarterly 13 (October):311-321.
The Conative Mind: Volition and Action.Jing Zhu - 2003 - Dissertation, University of Waterloo (Canada)

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
148 (#152,458)

6 months
15 (#198,278)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Keith Hossack
Birkbeck College

Citations of this work

The same-order monitoring theory of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - In Uriah Kriegel & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 143--170.
Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.
Moorean Paradox in Practice: How Knowledge of Action Can Be First-Personal.Alec Hinshelwood - 2024 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 102 (3):739-755.

View all 13 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Actions, Reasons, and Causes.Donald Davidson - 1963 - Journal of Philosophy 60 (23):685.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press.
On Action.Carl Ginet - 1990 - Mind 100 (3):390-394.

Add more references