The Coxford Lecture Honour, Oaths, and the Rule of Law

Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 32 (2):389-411 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Impersonality is frequently invoked as a core element of the rule of law. In this article, I discuss a troika of values and institutions–office, honour, and the oath–that provide deeply personal springs for the conduct of judges and other office-holders. In so doing, these institutions make possible the sort of impersonality valued by the rule of law. A focus on office emphasizes the importance of duty rather than power. Honour is the desire to be well thought of by others, and the internalized desire to deserve to be thought well of by others, especially one’s peers. Honour is often treated as an obsolete value that has been superseded by dignity. But it remains an essential force, providing judges and other office-holders with a source of energy and agency that motivates them to fulfil the duties of their office with virtue and excellence. The oath serves as a linchpin that connects the individual to the office and the office-holder to the commitment to serve honourably. Taken together, this troika of institutions encourages the faithful and energetic performance of one’s judicial office in a modern democratic constitutional society. Thinking about the rule of law this way encourages us to shift our focus from power to duty, and from doctrine to character and virtue. It encourages us to revive and revise honour rather than abandon it. It helps show that an impersonal “government of laws and not men” is and ultimately must be deeply personal.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,636

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-07-23

Downloads
6 (#1,699,245)

6 months
6 (#879,768)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Dignity: Its History and Meaning.Michael Rosen - 2012 - Harvard University Press.
Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality.Jon Elster - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 48 (4):650-651.
Philosophical Arguments.Charles Taylor - 1997 - Philosophical Quarterly 47 (186):94-96.
Honor: A Phenomenology. [REVIEW]Peter Olsthoorn - 2015 - Contemporary Political Theory 14 (1):e31-e33.

Add more references