Truth as Mediated Correspondence

The Monist 89 (1):28-49 (2006)
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Abstract

We will here describe a conception of truth that is robust rather than deflationist, and that differs in important ways from the most familiar robust conceptions.' We will argue that this approach to truth is intrinsically and intuitively plausible, and fares very well relative to other conceptions of truth in terms of comparative theoretical benefits and costs.

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Author Profiles

Robert Barnard
University of Mississippi
Terry Horgan
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

Backing as Truthmaking.Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):367–383.
Putting Pluralism in its Place.Jamin Asay - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (1):175–191.
Pluralism about Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism.Nikolaj Jang Linding Lee Pedersen & Cory Wright - 2012 - In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory Wright, Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
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Validity for Strong Pluralists.Aaron J. Cotnoir - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (3):563-579.

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