Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs [Book Review]

Philosophical Studies 153 (3):447 - 455 (2011)
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Abstract

Phenomenal intentionality and the evidential role of perceptual experience: comments on Jack Lyons, Perception and Basic Beliefs Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11098-010-9604-2 Authors Terry Horgan, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.

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Terry Horgan
University of Arizona

Citations of this work

Phenomenology and Perceptual Content.Kristjan Laasik - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):402-427.
Can AI Know?Ocean Cangelosi - 2024 - Philosophy and Technology 37 (3):1-13.

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References found in this work

The Significance of Consciousness.Charles P. Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.
Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.
The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.

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