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Probability and Evidence
Philosophy of Science 50 (4):659-660 (1983)
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Probability and Evidence. Paul Horwich. [REVIEW]Adam Morton - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):659-660.
Probability and Evidence by Paul Horwich. [REVIEW]Stephen Spielman - 1984 - Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):168-173.
Probability and Evidence.Lorraine Daston - 1998 - In Daniel Garber & Michael Ayers (eds.), The Cambridge history of seventeenth-century philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1108--1144.
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Citations of this work
Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.
Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.
Robustness, Reliability, and Overdetermination (1981).William C. Wimsatt - 2012 - In Lena Soler (ed.), Characterizing the robustness of science: after the practice turn in philosophy of science. New York: Springer Verlag. pp. 61-78.
Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):275-300.
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