Hornsby on the phenomenology of speech

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Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145 (2005)
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Abstract

The central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents’ knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided.

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10.1111/j.0309-7013.2005.00129.x

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Author Profiles

Jennifer Hornsby
Birkbeck, University of London
Jason Stanley
Yale University

Citations of this work

Know-how as Competence. A Rylean Responsibilist Account.David Löwenstein - 2017 - Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann.
Knowledge-How, Abilities, and Questions.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):86-104.
In defense of hearing meanings.Berit Brogaard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2967-2983.
Is there an empirical case for semantic perception?Steven Gross - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (10):3770-3795.

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References found in this work

Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The logical basis of metaphysics.Michael Dummett - 1991 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.

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