On global theories

Philosophy of Science 42 (2):152-179 (1975)
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Abstract

Contrary to the Empiricist model of science, successful sufficiently fundamental theories not only fit and unify their data fields but also prescribe the general terms in which relevantly to describe observation; specify what is and is not observable; specify the conditions under which what is observable, is observable; specify the instrumental means and reliability by which what is measurable is measured; specify what is causally, statistically, and merely accidentally connected. Moreover, such theories typically require all or most of the entire remainder of science to be properly applied in any given situation and theoreticians' models play a crucial role in such applications. (I call these respectively the internal and external globalnesses of theories.) A discussion of the consequences of these global features of theories for philosophy of science is offered in the context of specific examples and a structural model for science

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References found in this work

Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Les Etudes Philosophiques 17 (2):278-279.
Objective Knowledge.K. R. Popper - 1972 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 4 (2):388-398.
Models and Analogies in Science.Mary B. Hesse - 1966 - Philosophy and Rhetoric 3 (3):190-191.
The methodological character of theoretical concepts.R. Carnap - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1 (1):38--76.

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