Two scientific perspectives on nerve signal propagation: how incompatible approaches jointly promote progress in explanatory understanding

History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 46 (4):1-25 (2024)
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Abstract

We present a case study of two scientific perspectives on the phenomenon of nerve signal propagation, a bio-electric and a thermodynamic perspective, and compare this case with two accounts of scientific perspectivism: those of Michela Massimi and Juha Saatsi, respectively. We demonstrate that the interaction between the bio-electric perspective and the thermodynamic perspective can be captured in Saatsi’s terms of progress in explanatory understanding. Using insights from our case study, we argue that both the epistemic and pragmatic dimensions of scientific understanding are important for increasing explanatory understanding of phenomena. The epistemic dimension of understanding is important for increasing the number of actually answered what-if-things-had-been-different questions about a phenomenon, the pragmatic dimension for pointing out the potentially answerable what-if questions that have been overlooked or purposefully neglected thus far. Exposing the limitations of the acquired understanding within a particular perspective can be achieved by criticizing the assumptions that have been adopted to make models of the perspective intelligible, but that are considered problematic from a rival perspective.

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Henk W. de Regt
Radboud University

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References found in this work

The Concept of Mind.Gilbert Ryle - 1949 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 141:125-126.
How models are used to represent reality.Ronald N. Giere - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):742-752.
Four Kinds of Perspectival Truth.Michela Massimi - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (2):342-359.
An Epistemology of Scientific Practice.C. Kenneth Waters - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (4):585-611.
Perspectivism.Michela Massimi - 2017 - In Juha Saatsi (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Scientific Realism. New York: Routledge. pp. 164-175.

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