An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting

Economics Letters 236:111589 (2024)
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Abstract

In social choice theory with ordinal preferences, a voting method satisfies the axiom of positive involvement if adding to a preference profile a voter who ranks an alternative uniquely first cannot cause that alternative to go from winning to losing. In this note, we prove a new impossibility theorem concerning this axiom: there is no ordinal voting method satisfying positive involvement that also satisfies the Condorcet winner and loser criteria, resolvability, and a common invariance property for Condorcet methods, namely that the choice of winners depends only on the ordering of majority margins by size.

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Wesley H. Holliday
University of California, Berkeley

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