Reason, value and the muggletonians

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):484 – 487 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Michael Smith has argued that to value an action is to believe that if one were fully rational one would desire that one perform it. I offer the Muggletonians as a counter-example. The Muggletonians, a 17th century English sect, believed that reason was the path of the Devil. They believed that their fully rational selves - rational in just Smith's sense - would have blasphemed against God; and that their rational selves would have wanted their actual selves to do likewise. But blaspheming against God was not what they valued.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,173

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Avoiding the conditional fallacy.Joshua Gert - 2002 - Philosophical Quarterly 52 (206):88-95.
Morality and Paradoxical Deterrence.Steven Lee - 1985 - Social Philosophy and Policy 3 (1):136.
Reasons and advice for the practically rational.Robert Neal Johnson - 1997 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (3):619-625.
Good advice and rational action.Eric Wiland - 2000 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):561-569.
Michael Smith and the rationality of immoral action.Joshua Gert - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (1):1-23.
Is the desire for life rational?Christophe de Ray - forthcoming - Religious Studies:1-19.
Two solutions to the problem of divine hiddenness.Andrew Cullison - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):119 - 134.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
105 (#201,713)

6 months
9 (#477,108)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Richard Holton
Cambridge University

Citations of this work

How not to be muddled by a meddlesome muggletonian.John Bigelow & Michael Smith - 1997 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75 (4):511 – 527.
Enkrasia for Non-Cognitivists.Teemu Toppinen - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (5):943-955.
On Michael Smith's internalisms.Jordan Howard Sobel - 2001 - Erkenntnis 54 (3):345-373.

View all 6 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The moral problem.Michael R. Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Valuing: Desiring or Believing?Michael Smith - 1992 - In K. Lennon & D. Charles (eds.), Reduction, Explanation, and Realism. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 323--60.

Add more references