The Self-Evidencing Agent

Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press (forthcoming)
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Abstract

The Self-Evidencing Agent offers a unique method for addressing difficult philosophical questions. Self-evidencing occurs when an agent uses their model of the world and of themselves to explain what they observe in the world and in themselves, such that those observations become evidence for their model – the more agents explain, the more they self-evidence. This book argues that there is good reason to cast an agent’s existence itself in terms of self-evidencing, and that if we begin from this as a first principle, then we can make better sense of who and what we are, of how we engage in diverse ways with the world, and what matters to us. Self-evidencing can help situate attention, action, and perception. It also furnishes compelling approaches to decision-making and rationality, the self, of preferences and values. It can build bridges to consciousness, and even on to free will, and to meaning and wisdom.

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Jakob Hohwy
Monash University

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References found in this work

The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?Karl Friston - 2010 - Nature Reviews Neuroscience 11 (2):127–18.
New directions in predictive processing.Jakob Hohwy - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (2):209-223.

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