Cognitive Processes and the Assessment of Subjective Probability Distributions

Journal of the American Statistical Association 70 (350):271-289 (1975)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This article considers the implications of recent research on judgmental processes for the assessment of subjective probability distributions. It is argued that since man is a selective, sequential information processing system with limited capacity, he is ill-suited for assessing probability distributions. Various studies attesting to man's difficulties in acting as an "intuitive statistician" are summarized in support of this contention. The importance of task characteristics on judgmental performance is also emphasized. A critical survey of the probability assessment literature is provided and organized around five topics: the "meaningfulness" of probability assessments; methods of eliciting distributions; feedback and evaluation of assessors; differential ability of groups of assessors and the problems of eliciting a single distribution from a group of assessors. Conclusions from the analysis with respect to future work include the need to capitalize on cognitive simplification mechanisms; making assessors aware of both human limitations and the effects of task characteristics; and emphasizing feedback concerning the nature of the task at hand

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 105,326

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-05-26

Downloads
29 (#858,914)

6 months
4 (#1,008,875)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

Can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):317-370.
Are there any a priori constraints on the study of rationality?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):359-370.
L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.
Improvements in human reasoning and an error in L. J. Cohen's.David H. Krantz - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):340-340.

View all 37 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references