Two conceptions of person: John Mill and John Rawls

Griot 24 (2):49-61 (2024)
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Abstract

The objective of the present work is to make a comparison between Mill's and Rawls' conceptions of person. Through this comparison, the convergences and divergences between these views will be analyzed. The first step is to identify the principles of Millian moral psychology, which support his doctrine. He calls these aspects the general laws of the human emotional constitution: [i] taxonomy of pleasures; [ii] human dignity; [iii] sociability; [iv] individuality; [v] Aristotelian principle. In the second step I analyze what Rawls calls the political conception of the person. In this view, citizens are conceived as individuals who consider themselves free in three aspects, which are as follows: [i] they conceive of themselves and others as individuals who have a good conception, [ii] they recognize the right to make demands, [iii] and are able to take responsibility for their goals. Finally, in the third part I make a comparison between the two conceptions. It is noted that many of these aspects are interrelated, the conception of person and moral psychology seems to play the role of an anchor in the theoretical structure of both. The two philosophers anchor their principles of justice in moral psychology.

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