Abstract

This dissertation explores Germain Grisez's understanding of the relationship between religion and practical reason. It does so, first, by examining his general account of the axiological and moral facets of practical reason. Then, it moves to the specific question of how practical reason is related to religion. For Germain Grisez, religion is a basic good of human flourishing, and constitutes one to the foundational principles of practical rationality. Therefore, in order to be practically reasonable, one must respect and promote the good of religion, and at the very least, never directly act against this good. ;Grisez argues that revealed religion, accessible to faith, does not add new principles or moral norms to the foundational account of practical reason explicated prior to faith. Revealed religion does, however, contribute norms specific to the Christian way of life and, even more broadly, it indicates how the natural good of religion can be supernaturally completed. ;But Grisez fails to adequately establish that religion is one of the first principles of practical reason. This leads to a number of difficulties once he undertakes the transition from a philosophical account of practical reason to moral theology. The data of revelation are employed in order to render the good of religion intelligible. Thus, there is a fideistic link that runs against the grain of the system, for one of the primary principles of practical reason relies upon an act of faith in supernatural revelation. After isolating the problem of fideism, this dissertation goes on to examine certain methodological issues which need to be considered if the fideism is to be alleviated