Abstract

In our everyday language, groups are described as if they had intentions, beliefs, attitudes, rights, and responsibilities. This practice of group personification is especially prevalent in the legal context where corporations are taken to be fully capable legal entities. It is not difficult to find similar references to group personhood in the so-called canon of Western philosophy either (e.g. Hobbes, Rousseau, and Hegel). However, when we get to the latter half of the twentieth century, more individualistic notions of personhood have come to the fore. This paper focuses on three contemporary theories—by Peter French, by Carol Rovane, and by Christian List and Philip Pettit—that go against this common trend and argue for a robust group personhood. They all argue for the group personhood through collective rationality, shared purposes, group decision-making, and social performances. To what end though? On the one hand, their arguments want to place responsibility and blameworthiness at the group level as well. On the other hand, their aim is to map out the metaphysical conditions of personhood. Analysis of group personhood is an attempt to clear up the concept of personhood, which can have interesting consequences for our thinking about the (legal) status of social robots and animals as well.