Abstract

The focus of this dissertation is the question, "Can there be a rational basis for altruism?" and various analyses of the concept of reason-to-act as it bears on this question. I have argued that a Humean analysis of reasons-to-act entails that there cannot be a rational basis for altruism. I have examined, in some detail, the efforts of Kant and Thomas Nagel to establish a rational basis for altruism; and have concluded that both philosophers fail to deal adequately with this Humean analysis of reasons-to-act, and that this failure precludes the success of their respective projects. Finally, I have offered a refutation of the Humean analysis. My refutation is not designed to provide a means of salvaging either Kant's or Nagel's argument, for its conclusion is only that some of our reasons for acting must be objective, rather than, as Kant's and Nagel's positions require, that all of our reasons for acting must be objective. My purpose has been, rather, to raise the possibility of a different approach to the establishment of a rational basis of altruism: an approach that has the advantage of beginning with an intuitively more acceptable view of what there is reason to do