Personal Values and Setting Oneself Ends

In Thomas E. Hill, Human Welfare and Moral Worth: Kantian Perspectives. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press (2002)
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Abstract

The focus here is on what individuals value and pursue when considered apart from moral considerations. Personal values are contrasted with various kinds of moral values, but the central question is whether having the former commits one to the latter. Textual evidence casts doubt on the recently popular thesis that, in Kant's view, in setting ends agents thereby express a rational commitment to the objective goodness of their ends and acts. Unfortunately, influential Kantian arguments seem to use that dubious thesis to argue that even minimally rational agents are rationally committed to moral standards. A further troublesome issue considered here is whether, independently of debates about free will, Kant's idea that we “set ends” as an “act of freedom” implies an untenable voluntarism about how we come to have our basic goals.

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Citations of this work

Kant's Critique of Instrumental Reason.Markus Kohl - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (3):489-516.
Kant-Bibliographie 2002.Margit Ruffing - 2004 - Kant Studien 95 (4):505-538.

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