Moral Testimony: Transmission Versus Propagation

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):399-414 (2020)
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Abstract

The status of moral testimony has recently been challenged, for both epistemic and non‐epistemic reasons. This paper distinguishes two methods of teaching: transmission, “classic” learning from testimony, that results in second hand knowledge, and propagation which results in first hand knowledge and understanding. Moral propagation avoids most of the epistemic and non‐epistemic problems of transmission. Moreover, moral propagation can develop and refine non‐cognitive attitudes too. Therefore moral testimony should (and normally does) take the form of moral propagation, not transmission.

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Alison Hills
Oxford University

References found in this work

Content preservation.Tyler Burge - 1993 - Philosophical Review 102 (4):457-488.
Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.
Experts: Which ones should you trust?Alvin I. Goldman - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1):85-110.
In defense of moral testimony.Paulina Sliwa - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (2):175-195.

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