Abstract

The author, a member of the faculty in philosophy at Visva-Bharati University, produced this volume under appointment as Visiting Fellow at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, after having studied in England. These four essays are concerned with recent analytic thought, concentrating upon the problem of identity and the experiments of reflection which have appeared in modern British philosophy, such as Strawson’s world of nothing but sound. Chandra’s central concern is to analyse the relationship between identity and continuity, and to show that these concepts are not identical. Thus the book is an extended essay in conceptual clarification and logical geography. Saying that a is identical with b is not to say that a is continuous with b. All of this is undertaken because the author finds this inappropriate identification pervasive in contemporary philosophy, and the source of considerable logical confusion, especially in the consideration of personal identity. As an underlying theme attention is also focused upon the relevance of this issue to the debate concerning philosophical skepticism. Strawson’s sound world is seen as an attempt to refute the skeptic, which attempt fails because of Strawson’s failure to distinguish between identity and continuity. With the failure of Strawson’s attack upon the skeptic, and perhaps the phenomenalist as well, his defense of material bodies is thereby undermined. In addition to Strawson, Chandra studies Price, Ryle, Hick, and the very recent work on personal identity by Parfit. The author concludes that identity is consistent with discontinuous existence. He also offers an analysis of after-images, including not only visual after-images but after-images of taste as well. A further underlying theme is the use of science in such thought experiments, for they are frequently presented as if they were of a scientific character, thus exaggerating scientific capabilities. However, the nature of the relationship between philosophy and science is hardly clarified, and the nature of scientific limits remains vague throughout the book. Chandra has isolated a unique feature of contemporary analytic philosophy for consideration, for few others have so concentrated upon this strange feature of thought experiment which pervades British philosophy, nor the identification of identity and continuity. The book would have been improved tremendously, however, if the author had only indicated much more clearly than he does the philosophical conclusions which he wishes to draw from his reflections. These constantly remain uncertain and ambiguous.—H.A.D.