Abstract

Recently, there has been a growing body of work that takes a closer look at the concept of moral progress. In the following paper, I present various approaches that examine the phenomenon of moral progress by interpreting it in different ways: a) as a gain in inclusivity, b) as a consequence of comprehensive ethical reflexivity, c) as a cooperative accompaniment of technological and social progression, d) as a historical teleology materializing in the social sphere, e) as a postulate of change in ethical practice and f) as a dynamic medium of exchange between personal and impersonal reasons. What all these explanations have in common is that they regard moral progress as something desirable and also raise fundamental moral philosophical questions (e.g.What is the good? Are there moral facts? What can a morality look like that is neither selfish nor altruistic?) However, none of the approaches succeeds in freeing the concept from its inherent ambivalence.