Abstract

Because, according to Hegel, state and civil society are not identical (Introduction) it is hardly surprising that many paragraphs of the philosophy of right voice the tension between an actualisation of freedom which is adequate to the concept on the one hand and the actualisation of freedom in civil society on the other (I). The aspects of civil society, which mirror the tension with the actualisation of freedom in its full sense, do not justify, however, the conclusion that Hegel interprets civil society from the economic principle and not from that of right. For, according to Hegel, the economic life of civil society is not a thing, isolated and apart, and need is not contrary to freedom in a non-dialectic way. This is apparent from two aspects which are essential for civil society : it is a sphere of Bildung and a form of ethical life (II). Just as in the sphere of the subjective spirit Bildung is the transition to the idea of free will (§§ 20, 21), in the sphere of the objective spirit she is the transition to an ethical substantiality which is not natural any more, as is the case in the family, but spiritual (§ 187, A). On the subjectivity she bestows an objectivity which anables her to provide the universality with the filling content. The latter is realized in the state. An analysis of Hegel's interpretation of need, work and satisfaction of need dearly shows the inherent connection with Bildung (III). Civil society is not only the transition to the existence of concrete freedom, it is itself a limited form of actualisation of freedom. For it is not purely atomistic, but a form of ethical life. This is apparent from the administration of justice (Die Rechtspflege), from the welfare service of an administration (Die Polizei) and from the corporative organisation of social classes (Die Korporation). An analysis of this institutions shows also the inherent connection with Bildung (IV). Condusion : Hegel's interpretation of civil society and of the economic life in it is coherent with the constitutive principles of the philosophy of right. The dialectic relation of need and freedom which renders this coherence possible is also important for every philosophy which wants to reflect upon freedom in its actualisation, although it is clear that a distinction will have to be made between the principles and the concrete social institutions in which, in Hegel's view, these principles are embodied