A Fallibilist and Wholly Internalist Solution to the Gettier Problem

Journal of Philosophical Research 26:307-324 (2001)
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Abstract

How can a person avoid being Gettiered? This paper provides the first answer to that question that is both fallibilist and purely internalist. It is an answer that allows the justified-true-belief analysis of knowledge to survive Gettier’s attack (albeit as a nonreductionist analysis of knowledge).

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10538364

DOI

10.5840/jpr_2001_1

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Stephen Hetherington
University of New South Wales

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