Cuerpo, fuerza y mónada. Sobre el territorio metafísico de la física en G. W. Leibniz
Abstract
As a heir of two colossal traditions –i. e. Aristotelian and Cartesian–, G. W. Leibniz deals with the classical query of what constitutes bodily nature and how to explain phenomena between bodies. However, he points out himself many problems involved by those inherited traditions that shall be worked out so as to think properly. This paper aims to explain the way Leibniz overcomes the complications involved by traditional explanations given by Descartes and Cartesians, and how he rises above Mechanics in order to create a new science –Dynamics–, placing consequently the foundation of science of nature, or Physics, on the grounds of Metaphysics. Willing to reach such an statement, this innovative analysis underlines the importance of the notion of ‘force’, which could not be accurately understood without a main concept through Leibniz’ Metaphysics: the concept of a monad. Thus, in this paper it shall be firstly regarded Leibniz’ exam to Cartesian claim of extension as the essence of bodies, in the bounds of the intellectual context where Leibniz’ ideas are born. Secondly, it will be briefly explained the alternative Leibniz brings out to his exam through metaphysical notions.