Toward a Metaphysical Empirical Psychology

In Thomas Teo (ed.), Re-Envisioning Theoretical Psychology: Diverging Ideas and Practices. Springer Verlag. pp. 209-237 (2019)
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Abstract

As evidenced by textbook definitions and descriptions, modern academic psychology emphasizes the empirical side of the field, that is the experimental and data driven analysis that allow one to generate knowledge claims. Although empirical methods and data are central to the scientific enterprise, so too is the broad conceptual system and vocabulary employed to understand the data and draw conclusions from the experimental enterprise. Indeed, a major and longstanding critique of psychology is that it does not have a conceptual system for defining its key terms. This chapter advances theoretical psychology by introducing a continuum of analysis that stretches from the empirical through theoretical explanations into the major paradigms and then into meta-theoretical and finally metaphysical systems that provide the foundational concepts and categories. The argument made is that the field of psychology has struggled since its inception because it has lacked an effective metaphysical system to define its subject matter. The Tree of Knowledge System provides a framework that can serve as that metatheoretical system and be used to bridge the science of psychology to the practice of psychotherapy. As such, it offers a “Metaphysical Empirical” vision for the field.

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