Character-development and heaven

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 76 (3):319-330 (2014)
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Abstract

Numerous philosophers in recent decades have argued that a partial explanation for how the blessed in heaven are impeccable while remaining free and responsible is that they have cultivated or developed such a virtuous character prior to heaven that once in heaven they are incapable of acting contrary to their virtuously cultivated characters. Further, because the agents are at least partially responsible for the construction of their characters, they can be considered free and responsible with regard to the choices or actions such virtuous characters allow. In what follows I will argue that the impeccability of the blessed is not achieved through a character-development process performed by the blessed themselves

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Luke Henderson
North Carolina Wesleyan University

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References found in this work

Living Without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.
Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (211):308-310.
Living without Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):494-497.
Moral knowledge and ethical character.Robert Audi - 1997 - New York: Oxford University Press.

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