Abstract

Suárez’s conception of the principle of individuation of accidents and its relationship to the Thomistic solution is the main theme of the paper. In the fi rst part, the author briefl y recapitulates Suárez solution to the individuality and individuation of substances. In the second part he presents two main conceptions of the principle of individuation of accidents: substance and entitative theory of individuation. He presents four reasons for the entitative theory which are given by Suárez. In the third, the most ample part, he shows that Suárez argues that the Thesis of simultaneous co-existence of two mere numerically diff erent accidents in the same subject can be valid, at least, in the case of respective accidents. If it is not valid in the case of absolute accidents, then it is, according to Suárez, not because of the incompatible principle of individuation of accidents, but because of the fact that "nature abhors futility". Besides, he shows that God’s absolute potence towards numerical multiplication of qualities cannot be restricted by certain natural principles of intensifi cation and remission of qualities. In the last part, the author shows that if it is not contradictory that two mere numerically diff erent accidents can co-exist in the same subject, it is a fortiori valid about the Thesis of successive existence of the two mere numerically diff erent accidents in the same subject.