Abstract

The paper deals with the problem of conceptual interpretation of Aristotle’s prima facie divergent opinions on human happiness in his Nicomachean Ethics, especially in Book 1 and Book 10. As its starting point it takes the well-known expository scheme connected with the polarity “Dominantism versus Inclusivism”. It attempts to show that the relationship of two main candidates on human happines, namely the activities of moral virtues and of contemplation, should be understood on the basis of the predicative scheme called the intrinsic analogy of attribution. While both contemplation and the activities of moral virtues are intrinsically valuable, it is argued that they exhibit certain order of priority and posteriority: the theoretical activities of our intellect realise happiness primarly, whereas the moral activities merely secondarily. The desirable character of intrinsic goodness of our moral actions consists in the fact that they are beautiful and that they, in a certain way, approximate theoria. Interpreting the teleological relation between moral action and contemplation as one of approximation thus seems to represent a plausible alternative, which, unlike the standard means–end relation, keeps in balance both of the desiderata, i.e. the intrinsic goodness of our moral actions as well as their intrinsic orientation toward contemplation.